UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA * Case No. 22-CR-00471 (RER)

*

* Brooklyn, New York
* November 29, 2022

IBRAHIM ALHUSSAYEN,

Defendant. *

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TRANSCRIPT OF CRIMINAL CAUSE FOR SENTENCING BEFORE THE HONORABLE ERIC R. KOMITEE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

APPEARANCES:

v.

For the Government:

For the Defendant:

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(Proceedings commenced at 3:04 p.m.) 1 THE CLERK: Criminal cause for sentencing, United 2 States of America vs. Ibrahim Alhussayen, docket no. 22-CR-3 471. Would you all please state your appearance for the 5 record, starting with the government. 6 MS. WINIK: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Sara Winik 7 on behalf of the United States. 8 9 THE PROBATION OFFICER: Good afternoon, Your Honor. 10 Meghan Wing for Probation. THE COURT: Good afternoon. 11 12 MR. LEWIN: Good afternoon, Judge. Nick Lewin for 13 the defendant --14 THE CLERK: I'm sorry. Would you adjust the 15 microphone so that -- thank you. 16 MR. LEWIN: -- who is seated next to me. 17 Next to Mr. Alhussayen is Mounir Khaddar, who is 18 the court certified interpreter. 19 THE INTERPRETER: Good morning, Your Honor. 20 MR. LEWIN: Next to Mr. Khaddar is Varan Gumaste, 21 who is a lawyer at our law firm and also represents Mr. 22 Alhussayen. And finally, Rachel Kenny, who's an analyst at 2.3 our law firm. 24 THE COURT: Good afternoon, to you all. 25 THE COURT: And Mr. Alhussayen, good afternoon to

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MR. LEWIN: Yes, Judge. It's Mr. Alhussayen's preference and it's fine by us. We have no concerns about his ability to understand the proceedings.

THE COURT: Okay. I will say first of all that

that's fine with me but also second that, Mr. Alhussayen, it's obviously vitally important that you understand what's going on here today and there will be some legal jargon being spoken presumably, in addition to ordinary English.

And if at any point you want to have something repeated, have a minute to talk to your attorneys, have a question put to the court about something you don't understand, you should feel free to get your attorney's attention and let them know.

Do you understand?

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THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. So before we begin my practice is to explain the process for this proceeding.

First of all I will say a word or two about the guilty plea in this case. Second, I'll list the submissions that I have received and considered for sentencing.

And the purpose of listing all those submissions is to assure myself that I've received everything that the parties think I should have and also so that the parties know that they have all received everything that they should have and that way to confirm that we are all working off the same information here.

Next, under federal sentencing law, it's my obligation to determine what the guidelines range is. The United States Sentencing Guidelines, as you know, are

advisory. Nevertheless, I must determine what the guidelines range is and I must consider the advisory guidelines, as well as any departures that might apply in this case, even if I am not bound to follow the guidelines.

After I consider all of this, I will give the attorneys an opportunity to make any arguments they wish to make. That phase of today's proceeding takes on special significance, because we do not have a presentence report and, therefore, I will be leaning on the parties to fill any gaps, any relevant caps in the record.

And after I've heard from the attorneys, Mr.

Alhussayen, you will have the right to make a statement to the court, if you wish, before I impose sentence.

Once all of this has happened, I may take a short break to collect my thoughts and then I will then review what we call the 3553(a) factors. Those are the factors that federal law requires me to consider in order for me to determine the appropriate sentence in this case.

The factors include the defendant's personal history, the offense conduct at issue, and other factors that we will discuss. Following that I will impose sentence.

Mr. Alhussayen, do you understand the process?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Do you have any questions at this

point?

THE DEFENDANT: No, Your Honor.

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THE COURT: I understand the government has one or more individuals with us today who would like to be heard in terms of victim impact statements. Is that correct?

MS. WINIK: Yes, Your Honor. We have one victim present. I believe I might have flagged it for the court at our last status conference, but I don't think I provided written notification ahead, so I apologize for that.

THE COURT: That's fine. I have a victim impact statement in writing attached to the government's sentencing submission and I will be happy to hear from the person who's with us today as well.

I take it that should occur after the government has been heard on sentencing. Is that typically how you expect things to work?

MS. WINIK: Whichever you prefer, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. All right.

So a word about the guilty plea.

Mr. Alhussayen pleaded guilty on October 27th of this year. So a fairly recent guilty plea before Magistrate Judge Reyes.

The plea was to the sole count of an information that charged him with knowingly concealing material facts and making false statements to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, in violation of 18 U.S. Code Section 1001.

I've received and reviewed the transcript of the plea hearing before Judge Reyes. I had one question before I accept it, which was defense counsel was asked, as is typical in guilty plea proceedings, whether he was aware of any legal defenses to the alleged conduct in this case. Not factual defenses, but legal defenses and the answer, I'll paraphrase, was along the lines of not that we would like to assert here.

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Can counsel just elaborate a little on that? Are there any legal defenses that you believe exist, whether or not they're being asserted?

MR. LEWIN: Judge, that's hard to answer as clearly. I think there are legal defenses that exist. We don't believe they would succeed. We believe the resolution that we've reached with the government is, frankly, a far better outcome for Mr. Alhussayen.

So I would say there are no viable legal defenses.

THE COURT: No viable legal defenses.

MR. LEWIN: Yes, Judge.

THE COURT: Whether they're applicable in this case or not, viable in this case or not, what are the legal defenses to a 1001 claim? We don't have the exculpatory no doctrine in the Second Circuit anymore.

MR. LEWIN: Right. I mean, so Judge, I think there are -- I think in terms of legal defenses there were potentially questions about materiality and notice, but I

don't think that they, frankly, would come close to succeeding.

So, Judge, at this point, given where the facts lie, because it's hard to disentangle, of course, factual defenses from legal defenses. We don't have any viable legal defenses here that are unasserted.

THE COURT: Okay. Is there anything else the government thinks I should be asking on that subject?

MS. WINIK: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. So given that response, which I agree with in terms of how it's been phrased -- I mean, I don't know how the defense is thinking about the application of law to facts in this case, but I accept, having reviewed the plea colloquy, that Mr. Alhussayen's allocution more than satisfied the elements of the offense. I don't see any indication in anything before me that there is an adequate legal defense to the charges.

I read the plea transcript to indicate that Mr. Alhussayen's plea was knowing and voluntary and that there exists a factual basis for it and I now accept the guilty plea and adjudge Mr. Alhussayen guilty of the offense charged.

I will say, and we'll get into this more later as this proceeding goes on, that I view the conduct here as being on the substantially more serious end of the spectrum

of Section 1001 cases and we can talk a bit as we go on about why that is.

Let me next identify the documents in my possession now. We don't have a presentence report. That was because the defense requested and the government agreed not -- to proceed without a presentence report in this case.

I have received the following: A sentencing memorandum from the defense dated November 4th of this year in both redacted and unredacted form, the government sentencing memorandum dated November 14th also in redacted and unredacted form and as I mentioned the government's sentencing submission contains a victim impact statement on behalf of a person who was targeted by the underlying conduct here.

I have the executed plea agreement, which is dated October 27th of 2022, and I have a letter from the government dated October 31st enclosing the plea transcript, proposing that I accept the plea and also including certain paperwork related to a proposed removal order, which we'll also talk about today.

The removal paperwork includes the following: A proposed removal order, the government's notice of intent to request that order, certain factual allegations that the government sets out in support of judicial removal and also a signed plea statement from Mr. Alhussayen in support of

removal. That statement is dated October 28th and indicates, 1 2 I believe, that Mr. Alhussayen consents to the order of 3 removal being entered. I also have a letter from Immigration and Customs enforcement concurring in the request for a removal order. 5 That letter is dated September 28th of 2022. 6 7 From the defense perspective, is there anything else that I should have that I did not just list? 8 9 MR. LEWIN: No, Judge. There's not. THE COURT: From the government's perspective? 10 MS. WINIK: No, Your Honor. 11 THE COURT: And I take it I have not received 12 anything from Probation in this case. 13 14 THE PROBATION OFFICER: Correct, Your Honor. 15 THE COURT: Thank you. 16 All right. So those are the documents we are 17 working off of today. I have no indication that either party 18 is seeking an evidentiary hearing on any issue. 19 Is that correct from the government's perspective? 20 MS. WINIK: Correct, Your Honor. THE COURT: And from the defense? 21 2.2 It is, Your Honor. That's correct. MR. LEWIN: 2.3 THE COURT: Okay. Does the defense dispute -- and

a fair number of factual assertions in the government's

we can get into this also more as we go along, but there are

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sentencing memorandum, some of which are taken from the complaint and other sources. Does the defense dispute any assertions in the government's sentencing submission that you believe could be material to today's proceeding?

MR. LEWIN: Judge, I think you're right to say that some of this perhaps makes sense to take as it arises. There are -- Ms. Winik and I have spoken about a few very limited areas in which there may not be total agreement on facts, but they may be immaterial. And so certainly if they come up, we can address them.

I'm happy to address them now with the court, but
I'm not sure that they're material facts. There are -- again,
I'm happy to address this however Your Honor wishes. Either
lay them out or take it in the ordinary course.

THE COURT: I think we take it in the ordinary course, but let me just say by way of background, you know, in the usual sentencing posture we would have a presentence report. We'd have objections from either or both of the government and the defense to some or all of the narrative recitations in that report.

And to the extent there were paragraphs in the PSR to which nobody had objected, the court would typically be taking those as undisputed.

I think you will hear me make reference at times as we go through today's proceeding to representations of fact

in the government's sentence submissions and you should understand yourself as entitled and maybe even indeed obligated to speak up, to the extent those are factual assertions with which you would take issue.

MR. LEWIN: Thank you, Judge.

We won't hesitate to do that. I think we're talking about general categories. To the extent Your Honor has questions about the phone, whether or not it was lost, that would be something that certainly we would dispute the implication of.

To the extent Your Honor has questions about the "multiple deleted WhatsApp messages," that's something that we certainly could address in the ordinary course. And there are a few other small things.

But, again, it's hard to know as we sit here now what Your Honor deems material. And so we won't hesitate to speak up. We understand the implications of not having a presentence report in which some of these factual issues are resolved.

And so, again, with Your Honor's permission, when appropriate, we're happy to address those factual questions.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. It sounds like we have a meeting of the minds there. The government is not seeking an evidentiary hearing on any issue, correct?

MS. WINIK: Correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. All right.

So turning next to the adviso

So turning next to the advisory guidelines calculation, the parties agree that the total offense level under the sentencing guidelines is four. We get there via a base offense level of six under Section 2(b), as in bravo, 1.1(a)(2) of the guidelines, which provides a base offense level of six.

Can the government just say a word or two about why 2(b)1.1(a)(2) is the appropriate guideline here and why you don't see any cross references or specific offense characteristics applying?

MS. WINIK: Yes, Your Honor. May I have just a moment to consult the guidelines?

THE COURT: Yes, please.

(Pause.)

MS. WINIK: Your Honor, the sentencing guidelines specifically refer to 2(b)1.1 for an 18 USC 1001 violation.

Based on a review of any of the specific offense characteristics, the government does not see that any of them apply and, therefore, 2(b)1.1(a)(2) would be appropriate.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. WINIK: Unless there's a specific section that the court would like to reference, I'm happy to take a look, but I don't see any that would apply.

THE COURT: Yeah. I mean, this -- again, this is a

subject we could take up now or later, but I will be interested in the government's view of whether any of the relevant conduct in this case, however defined, could have been prosecuted under another statute or another section of the guidelines. We'll take that up if and when it becomes relevant.

I take it the defense has no objection to the guidelines calculation?

MR. LEWIN: Correct, Judge. No objection. We think it's correct.

THE COURT: Okay. So we have a base offense level of six. As I mentioned, two levels are subtracted for acceptance of responsibility under Section 3(e)1.1(a).

The government does not provide any information suggesting that Mr. Alhussayen has any prior criminal conviction so we have zero criminal history points, resulting in a criminal history category of Roman numeral one.

And based upon a total offense level of four, and a criminal history category of one, the guidelines provide for a range of imprisonment of zero to six months.

The guidelines for Class D felonies like this one is -- generally provide for a range of supervised release from one year to three years, but the guidelines also provide in Section 5(d), as in delta, 1.1(c), as in Charlie, that the court ordinarily -- ordinarily should not impose a term of

supervised release in a case in which supervised release is not required by statute and the defendant is a deportable alien who will likely be deported after imprisonment.

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I believe, as do other judges, that it can in certain cases be appropriate to impose a term of supervised release, especially when it could be that the defendant's cooperation with immigration authorities might be made a term of supervised release, and in the process, to state explicitly on the record, that I do not wish or expect that the defendant will be held in the United States for the term of supervised release.

I'll be interested when the attorneys make their arguments, if they have a view on that subject, to hear what that view may be.

But what I'm contemplating in terms of supervised release is a one year term, where cooperation with the immigration authorities under the order of removal would be a term of supervised release, maybe the payment of a fine, if I were to impose one, would be a term of supervised release and the like.

Speaking of fines, the guideline fine range in this case is \$500 at the low end, and \$9,500 at the high end under Section 5(e)1.2(c)(3) of the guidelines.

And in the absence of a presentence report I will, of course, be interested in the party's arguments regarding

Mr. Alhussayen's ability to pay a fine. So that's the application of the guidelines here.

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In terms of the statutory provisions at issue, the statutory maximum term of imprisonment for a violation of Section 1001 is five years. The maximum term of supervised release by statute is three years. The maximum fine is \$250,000 by statute and a special assessment of \$100 is mandatory.

Does the defense agree or disagree with anything I just said?

MR. LEWIN: We agree, Judge.

THE COURT: And the government?

MS. WINIK: We also agree, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. So with all that having been said by way of preliminaries and with the parties' knowledge that I've reviewed their written sentencing submissions, let me turn now to Mr. Lewin and ask if you want to be heard further.

MR. LEWIN: I do, Judge. May I speak from the podium?

THE COURT: Yeah, please.

MR. LEWIN: Thank you, Judge, and may it please the court first, Your Honor, I'll introduce two people who are here with us today, both of whom have traveled from Saudi Arabia to be here.

The first who's standing now is Ibrahim's father, Aborachman (ph) and the second is Ibrahim's mother, Turkia (ph), who traveled just recently to be with Ibrahim during this period leading up to sentencing.

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THE COURT: Good afternoon to you both.

MR. LEWIN: Judge, we're here, obviously, because on three separate occasions across a six month period Ibrahim chose to lie to and to mislead federal agents.

In each of those three interviews federal agents asked Ibrahim to list his social media accounts and in intentionally withheld and did not tell them about certain of those accounts, including one, an Instagram account, that both the government and we have referred to as the Samer account, S-A-M-E-R, for the court reporter.

Judge, the first interview, as Your Honor knows, was in June of 2021. Ibrahim was visited at his home by federal agents. They said they were there to ask questions about his F-1 visa.

Among many other questions the agents asked him, list your social media accounts. Ibrahim knowingly and intentionally made the decision to omit other accounts and only list the accounts that he believed he most frequently used.

The second interview --

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THE COURT: Hold on one second. I'm sorry.

(Pause.)

THE COURT: Is the microphone on, do we know?

MR. LEWIN: It does have a green light, Judge.

THE COURT: Okay.

(Court and the clerk confer.)

THE CLERK: Maybe lean in.

MR. LEWIN: I'll lead in, Judge.

THE COURT: I'm hearing it. Just for the record,

I'm hearing everything you're saying perfectly clearly.

Apparently it's not coming through entirely clearly on the recording. We will look into the cause of that but, yes, if you could just stay a little bit closer to the microphone I think that would get us there.

MR. LEWIN: I will, Judge. I will. And if there's a problem, please just interrupt again. I can move back if that's more convenient for the court reporter.

Judge, the second interview in which Ibrahim knowingly and intentionally chose to lie was about a month later. It was also at his home. Agents once again did not tell him about the subject matter of the investigation but again asked him to list his social media accounts. He again gave only his primary accounts and omitted the Samer account.

Finally, about five and a half months later at

Dulles Airport Ibrahim was returning for his last month of

study. He was, again, interviewed by federal agents. Again,

he was not informed about the subject matter of the investigation but he was again asked to identify his social media accounts and he, again, omitted a number of accounts, including, importantly for this case, the Samer account.

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Indeed in this interview Ibrahim was specifically asked do you have any other accounts that you have not previously given agents and he once again falsely stated that he did not. He lied.

Judge, Ibrahim did not forget during these interviews that he had these accounts. He did not misunderstand what was being asked of him. He made the decision to knowingly and intentionally lie to and mislead investigators.

He did that first by not telling them about certain accounts he had and second he did that by falsely claiming he had no other accounts when, in fact, he did have other accounts, including the Samer account.

So, Judge, I want to address first why? Why did

Ibrahim commit this crime of making false statements to

federal agents?

Judge, I'm going to give two reasons, but I think it's important to state up front that I don't offer these reasons as excuses.

What I mean there is we don't offer these reasons to minimize his conduct, to explain away his conduct or to

justify his conduct. That's not the intent.

But, Judge, you are the human being that is sentencing another human being potentially to a term of additional incarceration and we assume that you would want to know the motivation, why was it that Ibrahim made this conscious decision not to just be truthful to the agents when he was asked about these social media accounts.

So let me take his two reasons in turn. His first reason was embarrassment. Your Honor has read these messages. I've read these messages. These messages can be read as hateful, harassing, mocking and even menacing. They use crude and angry language and they are on deeply controversial social, political and religious issues.

The reason -- the principal reason that Ibrahim set up the Samer account in the first instance was that he wanted to be able to say things anonymously that he would not want attributed to him publicly.

In fact, Your Honor, we believe that if
theoretically Ibrahim's wife or his mother, who's sitting
here now, or even his father had seen these posts and had
said to Ibrahim did you write these posts, he would have said
no. He would have lied to his family too.

So when the federal agents came around asking him about his social media accounts he made the decision affirmatively, knowingly and intentionally not to tell them

about these accounts for fear of lifting the veil of anonymity he thought he had constructed over these messages.

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So that, Judge, was the first reason that was in his mind when he chose to commit the federal crime that he now stands convicted of.

Second, Ibrahim believed and made the unilateral decision that the agents were really only interested in his main social media accounts, meaning the accounts that he used most frequently.

This is, of course, Judge, not a decision that was Ibrahim's to make, not in any way, shape or form. But recall that during these interviews, agents did not tell Ibrahim that they were investigating his social media accounts, or postings or harassing messages. In fact, they affirmatively told him what they were principally looking at was issues related to his F-1 visa, among other issues.

So he made a decision that would --

THE COURT: Among other specified issues or among other unnamed?

MR. LEWIN: Well, Judge, I believe in the first interview Ibrahim's impression was and what he was told was that this related to his F-1 visa, his student visa, the visa in which he was sort of present in the United States.

The second interview relates to allegedly, I guess, extremist websites that were being visited from an IP

address. And that was the reason proffered by agents.

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And in the third interview, again, all of this is according to the complaint and our understanding from the sentencing --

THE COURT: Is that IP address one of his IP addresses?

MR. LEWIN: What was said and, again, you can ask the government, was that there was an IP address in the home that we being -- that was hitting on some sort of extremist websites, thought it wasn't clear whether it was his IP address who was visiting it. But that was the rationale given during the second interview.

All I can do, Judge, is give the information that I have, of course, from the complaint and from what Ibrahim recalls.

And then the third interview, Judge, which was the January, 2022 interview at Dulles Airport, the rationale given was simply that there was an investigation being conducted in conjunction with the Eastern District of New York.

I think it's important now, Judge, to pause and say something and to say it clearly. Ibrahim did not lie to protect anyone else.

So first, Ibrahim sent these messages on his own.

No person, no government asked, demanded directed, suggested,

implied in anyway that Ibrahim should send these messages.

The life altering decision that Ibrahim made to send each one of these messages was his decision and his decision alone.

Similarly, no one, no person, no government asked, suggested, demanded, implied or directed Ibrahim to lie to the FBI when the FBI three different times asked him about his social media accounts.

Once, again, Judge, that decision, that life altering decision to lie to the FBI was his and his alone.

So I will just say this clearly, Judge. Ibrahim Alhussayen was not acting as an agent of anyone, any government. Not the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia or any other government or any person. He was acting exclusively and categorically on his own.

And I believe if Your Honor asks that the government would acknowledge that it does not have evidence that Ibrahim Alhussayen was acting as an agent to the Saudi government.

THE COURT: Can you say a little bit more by way of deep background, either now or later in your presentation, about the circumstances that lead him to come to the United States and study in Mississippi in the first place?

What is his Ph.D dissertation? He's interviewing Saudi postal workers by questionnaire to ask them what they

think of the culture of the Saudi post office?

MR. LEWIN: Yes. So, Judge, I can talk about -- so
Ibrahim first came to the United States in I believe 2012 for
a master's degree in Kentucky in public administration.

After graduating from his master's, he proceeded on to his
doctoral degree at Jackson State in Mississippi, which was in
public administration.

And his research was a survey of the Saudi postal service and the progress it made in reaching the goals of Saudi's Vision 2030 program, which is sort of a general modernization that the government of Saudi Arabia has implemented. It has a number of different prongs, one of which is to improve government services provided to Saudi citizens.

Other prongs are to reduce its dependence on sort of the energy sector and to modernize, I think, culturally.

But one aspect, one prong of Vision 2030 is the improvement of government services, including the postal service. And that's what his dissertation was in.

THE COURT: And his research consists of what?

Sending questionnaires to postal workers in Saudi Arabia?

MR. LEWIN: Judge, if I could have a minute to ask,
I will confess that I haven't dug deeply into the
dissertation topic, but if Your Honor gives me 20 seconds --

THE COURT: I mean, I ask because there's something

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missing from the explanation. You know, he travels from Saudi Arabia to the United States, away from his family. He's being paid by the government of Saudi Arabia to do this, or at least they're paying for his educational and living expenses, and his research consists, as the papers seem to indicate, of sending questionnaires to postal workers in Saudi Arabia so as to understand their views about the culture of the post office and how much the culture of the post office has an impact on their ability to do their jobs.

So there may well be something missing from the papers, but as the record stands, it seems to verge almost on satire that somebody would travel here for that purpose.

MR. LEWIN: Well, Judge, I don't think that is the purpose. I mean, I think -- to be clear. So first -- and I don't -- because of this forum, there are aspects of our submission that we put in under seal.

But I would direct Your Honor's attention to page 4 of our sentencing submission. It's the second full paragraph. And it's the last sentence of the second full paragraph, which appears on page 4 of our submission dated November 4th.

THE COURT: Page 4 of 7.

MR. LEWIN: Correct, Judge.

THE COURT: Last sentence of the first full

paragraphs.

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MR. LEWIN: Correct. It begins "It was only after."

THE COURT: No, I see that, but that doesn't explain -- I mean, that explains one discreet --

MR. LEWIN: So, Judge, let's be clear. That was a significant animating factor in Ibrahim's decision not to leave his family, but to come with his wife to the United States, to receive a master's degree and then to continue with doctoral studies in the United States. All of his children were born while he was here studying in the United States.

And, in fact, growing up, as Your Honor may have seen, Ibrahim's father, who is here, also was involved in a similar program whereby he came to the United States to study.

Ibrahim's goals here for coming to the United

States were one, what's set forth in that paragraph, Judge,

but also to advance his education. He spent years working on

a master's program and a doctoral dissertation. A real

doctoral dissertation --

THE COURT: That's the part I'm interested in hearing more specifics about, if they can be mustered.

MR. LEWIN: And if you can -- with apologies, just

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THE COURT: No, no. Take your time.

MR. LEWIN: -- perhaps give me -- is it that Your Honor would like to know a little more about the specifics of the dissertation, what was studied and --

THE COURT: How does the research work, what is he studying and what is his aspiration on return to Saudi Arabia in terms of how he would put this education to use.

MR. LEWIN: Sure. I can address the last part, which is to say his aspiration upon his return to Saudi Arabia -- not only his aspiration, but his obligation is to return to the Saudi government and continue his service in the Saudi Royal Court or the Saudi government.

When the government of Saudi Arabia agrees to pay for a part of a person's education, as they do for hundreds, if not thousands of students every year here in the United States, Saudi government employees who come to study not just in the United States, but in the United Kingdom and elsewhere, they have an obligation when they return to continue to work for the government.

And that is what Ibrahim's aspiration is. It is to return to the Saudi Royal Court and to continue at a higher level, because he now will advance because of his multiple graduate level degrees to a higher level inside the court to work as an administrator within the court.

He's not sure what he's going to be doing, but that is what he aspires to. The extent to which -- well, first of

all, Judge, the extent to which anyone's dissertation necessarily relates to the practical work they do upon receiving their dissertation I think is an open question, but that is his obligation and his aspiration, to return to Saudi Arabia to work in the Royal Court, or to work in the government as an administrator with increasing levels of responsibility.

With respect to what -- a little more detail about the type of research that was done in the dissertation, I have to consult with Ibrahim and I'm happy to do that.

THE COURT: Please. And also to note during what time period his wife was in the U.S. How long she's here with him.

MR. LEWIN: From beginning until end. She got -Judge, let me be precise. There may have been times when
Ibrahim was here and his wife was back. But generally
speaking they moved here together. They had their daughters
here together and she left on June 27th on the flight that he
was -- that he did not board because he was arrested.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

MR. LEWIN: Thanks, Judge.

(Pause.)

THE COURT: You're back here.

MR. LEWIN: Just for a moment, Judge.

THE COURT: Sure.

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MR. LEWIN: Because my instinct is to the extent Your Honor has follow up questions I think Ibrahim may be able to answer them rather than me get it and then convey it to you.

THE COURT: Whatever you prefer is fine with me.

MR. LEWIN: That's fine. So let me try. I'll give

a little bit.

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So first, Ibrahim's dissertation was supervised by a Jackson State University professor named Johnny Gillian, who advised him on this methodology.

His methodology was twofold, Judge. First, he conducted ten interviews of postal workers in Saudi Arabia, like actual in-person interviews.

Second, he conducted a survey of postal workers in Saudi Arabia. Apparently they -- I don't know how many they sent out but they received 86 survey responses back and they used only 84 of them. If Your Honor wants to know why they only used 84, I can ask, or Your Honor can certainly ask directly.

Essentially, the dissertation related to basically ways in which organizational culture within the Saudi postal service could sort of improve job performance and help the Saudi postal service achieve increased performance goals pursuant to and consistent with Vision 2030.

There were four dimensions of Ibrahim's conclusion.

So he write a dissertation, he uses these two methodologies, the ten interviews and 84 survey results to make essentially -- to identify four dimensions in which change could be made.

The first was -- and, again, if Your Honor has follows ups, I think it might make sense to address them directly to Ibrahim and I'm comfortable with him answering the court, to the extent that's what the court wishes.

The first relates to managing change within the organization. The second relates to achieving and presumable documenting goals. The third is coordinating team work and the fourth is decision making, Judge. Improving decision making within the postal service of Saudi Arabia.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. LEWIN: I think to the extent this is not clear, Your Honor should blame that on me as opposed to Ibrahim, because I just have not dug into the substance of his dissertation.

But he did receive his -- he passed -- he passed his exams. He received his dissertation from Jackson State this May.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. LEWIN: If Your Honor has follows up's,

certainly --

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THE COURT: Not at this point. Thank you.

MR. LEWIN: Thanks, Judge.

So, Judge, where I left off was -- and I do want to be clear about it, Ibrahim's decision making here was entirely his own. His posts were his own. His decision to lie was his own.

I think perhaps most importantly, Judge, I'm going to turn to what we would submit to Your Honor, respectfully, are the mitigating factors here.

There's a temptation, because this is the first time other than our conference, for the court to sort of start --

THE COURT: Just so we don't necessarily end of the aggravating factors -- I understand you wanting to take on the aggravating factors first and the mitigators second, why is he -- well, do you dispute that he was actually asking for a meeting with one of the recipients of these hostile messages and do you dispute that he also sent a photo of an elderly relative to one of those recipients as well, and those may possibly be the same recipient.

MR. LEWIN: I believe they're different recipients, Judge.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. LEWIN: With respect to the meeting, it was never Ibrahim's intent to meet with the person to whom he sent that -- let me just --

THE COURT: Why is he asking for a meeting?

MR. LEWIN: Judge, just let me pull up my notes.

But the short answer to that is Ibrahim is trying to provoke these people. Ibrahim is trying to --

THE COURT: Well, that's not what the -- the meeting request said I've got information that could be helpful to you.

MR. LEWIN: Correct.

THE COURT: And I need to see you in person to deliver it. I'm paraphrasing here.

MR. LEWIN: Yeah.

THE COURT: What's going on there?

MR. LEWIN: Judge, these messages are, as I said, an attempt to -- essentially to provoke.

What he's looking to do is essentially lift their hopes. Perhaps they have information and then lower them. He never had any expectation or desire to meet with them. These were not serious. These were ways to provoke people into responding, into perhaps lifting their expectations and then seeing what their reaction would be.

None of that's admirable, Judge, but it was part of21 --

THE COURT: It's quite a coincidence that he's talking to a person who's, if I understand the facts correctly, and please correct me if I don't, talking to a person who's essentially on the move because of a history of

having been threatened and asking this woman for her physical location.

MR. LEWIN: Yes. Judge, with respect to this recipient, the messages that Ibrahim sent offered information relevant to a public legal case in which that recipient had been accused of defamation. He offered to show that recipient information in person. Ibrahim never had --

THE COURT: Yes, but even you would agree that that's not his true purpose for seeking to meet with this person.

MR. LEWIN: Well, Judge, certainly it was not his purpose to meet with this person. He didn't have any information. He wasn't living anywhere near the person. He wasn't trying to get information about where this person actually lived with any intent of meeting her, of entrapping her.

He wanted to provoke her to see what her reaction would be. He wanted to maybe raise her hopes and shut them down. Judge, that's not admirable. That's harassing and certainly is menacing, but it was not a serious attempt. It was not a serious attempt to meet with her.

He had nothing to offer her, Judge. He did not actually have that information.

THE COURT: Okay. And what about the photo of the elderly relative.

1 MR. LEWIN: Just give me one moment, Judge. I 2 believe I know the answer, but I want to confirm it. THE COURT: Please. 3 MR. LEWIN: Thank you. 5 (Pause.) THE COURT: And just for context on my prior 6 7 question about why he's asking one of the recipients about her whereabouts, he's also sending text messages to people 8 saying I will know where you are and get you. 9 10 But your position is he actually doesn't want to 11 know where people are or to get them. MR. LEWIN: Yes, Judge. To be clear, that's 12 correct. Again, what I am not saying is that these are 13 14 appropriate messages, these are laudable messages. These are 15 harassing and menacing messages. That was the intention 16 behind these messages to harass people. 17 I mean, for lack of a better term, Judge, to mess 18 with them. 19 THE COURT: Well, that seems pretty euphemistic to 20 me, but please continue. 21 MR. LEWIN: Yes, Judge. 22 And with respect to the photo, there is no factual 23 dispute that he sent the photo. The photo was of the 24 recipient's grandfather. This is part of a well known family

where the mother is a well known journalist. He sent that

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photo and it's the same thing.

THE COURT: The same thing. He wants to get this recipient's hopes up and then deflate them after the fact?

MR. LEWIN: Yes. I think provoke, harass, menace. Express disagreement in a way that's not only not fruitful but that's inappropriate though, again, to the extent Your Honor wants to discuss it, we don't think it's criminal.

Judge, I should just add that we don't doubt that these messages had an affect on their recipients. I think when you hear from Ibrahim I think you will hear him say -- I know you will hear him say, Judge, that he has now come to realize the impact that his messages have had on other people, the same thing that I think he will tell you, he did not actually appreciate before.

The anonymity of the internet, I think as Your
Honor perhaps has seen, allows people to say things that they
would never say in person, horrible things. The level of
discourse on the internet is staggering and, unfortunately,
Ibrahim's messages fit right in.

But at the end of the day, Judge, and we can talk about this, while Your Honor certainly is permitted both by statute, 3661, and by the guidelines, to consider all of this as relevant conduct, and we have no objection to Your Honor considering it, it should be considered within the parameters of what this is, which is a charged false statement case.

The government has not criminally charged Ibrahim for sending these messages.

And one thing I'd flag, Judge, is that in many 1001 cases, 1001 cases are brought when the underlying facts are disturbing.

We gave a few examples in our sentencing submission to DEA agents, a BOP employee, the SSCI, or Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, director of security, a lawyer at Skadden Arps.

Often in 1001 cases the underlying conduct, the conduct that gives rise to the interview in which the person who is then convicted commits the crime of 1001 is often bad conduct, but not always chargeable.

And so there is a concern here that as to the extent that Your Honor looks at these messages, which were not charged and fairly considered as relevant conduct, but looks at these messages as really substantial aggravating factors, there really is a risk of having an unwarranted sentencing disparity between defendants found guilty of similar conduct, which is --

THE COURT: What was the lie in the Skadden case?

It's about whether they had been engaged by Ukraine to write the report they wrote?

MR. LEWIN: No. That is, I believe, the *Greg Craig* case and I don't remember -- it's Alex Vandertwine, and I

don't remember what his specific lie was. But these are real lies and real cases of real significance.

THE COURT: Okay.

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MR. LEWIN: Your Honor, may I proceed?

THE COURT: Yes. Please. Sorry.

MR. LEWIN: No. Thank you, Judge.

I really -- I do think it's critical to focus on what I'll describe as the mitigating factors. And as I started saying, Judge, there is a temptation to assume that nothing has come before or to understand as an intellectual matter that something has come before today but not truly appreciate what's come before and the consequences. And so my goal briefly is to lay out what has come before.

Some of the consequences I'll describe are ones that every convicted defendant faces prior to sentencing, Judge, admittedly.

Others are not. Others are somewhat unique to Ibrahim's circumstances and to this case.

So first I want to describe what I would describe as the consequences that he's already face and then I want to describe his attempts to atone for what he did.

So first, Judge, with respect to consequences I'll address three things. Jail, bail and immigration.

Ibrahim has, as Your Honor noted, spent more than a month, 35 days in jail, in conditions that were particularly

challenging and in many ways, frankly, are atypical for pretrial detention of a defendant.

About ten of his 35 days were in solitary confinement, more than half of his time in pretrial detention

THE COURT: Why is he in solitary?

MR. LEWIN: Because often, Judge, especially with COVID, when inmates are brought in -- this was --again, Judge, he was arrested on June 27th. He was released on August 1st. They were put in solitary confinement for health reasons to isolate them from other inmates.

In addition, in some facilities -- remember every facility he was held --

THE COURT: Okay. But you mean solitary confinement like special housing unit solitary confinement or you mean just now allowed to interact in common areas?

MR. LEWIN: So the SHU is its own thing, but I'm not sure there's a binary there, Judge. He was held in solitary confinement where he was not able to interact with other human beings. He was being held in his own cell and he was not able to interact with other human beings.

Not only not able to act within the jails, Judge -- and remember, each one of these, and I'm going to go through them just briefly --

THE COURT: Where -- he's at MDC or -- he's partly

in jail in Virginia I know, but is any of this time spent in federal custody?

MR. LEWIN: Very briefly, Judge. For about ten days initially he's held in the Alexandria County Virginia Detention Facility.

For that entire ten-day period he had no contact with his family. So he was arrested. His family got on an airplane and went home, his wife and children.

He was jailed and for this entire ten-day period between June 27th and I believe July 7th he was incommunicado. He had one visitor, Judge, and that was me. And I was there for three hours.

After that ten-day period he was moved from Alexandria, Virginia, to the Northern Neck Regional Jail in Warsaw, Virginia, which is in Central Eastern Virginia. It's a county jail. He was held there for nine days and had virtually no contact with his family.

Then he was moved from Warsaw Virginia to Grady
County, Oklahoma. He was held in Grady County, Oklahoma for
about ten days, some of that -- I think only about three of
those days was he able to communicate with his family.

He was then moved finally into federal custody on or about the 27th of July. That's a Wednesday, Judge. He arrived at the MDC in Brooklyn on a Wednesday night.

He was not able to talk to anyone Wednesday night or

Thursday.

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On Friday I first spoke to him. So this is Friday now, the 29th, and he was only presented and released on bail on Monday, which is the 1st. So he spent Wednesday, Thursday and Friday at the MDC in Brooklyn?

THE COURT: Why is that? Was he not supposed to be presented within 24 hours of arrival in Brooklyn?

MR. LEWIN: Judge, I don't fault anyone for this.

I think this related to COVID protocols. It related to testing. And it related to solitary. But the real life impact was that Ibrahim was held from Wednesday night until Monday before he was presented and released on bail at the MDC.

THE COURT: Okay. I mean, I understand it's not necessarily relevant to our purpose here today, but if there was an extended violation of his legal rights, or even a BOP protocol associated with that delay between arrival at the MDC and presentment at an arraignment here, I would be interested to know about it.

MR. LEWIN: So, Judge, I don't want to -- I don't know --

THE COURT: I don't want to hijack this -- I don't want to move this off course, but --

MR. LEWIN: But I do think it's important to say one thing with respect to the prosecutors, who are both in

this courtroom and were involved in that case, they were diligently and in good faith doing the same thing I was, which was trying to find Ibrahim.

THE COURT: I'm not talking about the U.S. Attorney's Office here.

MR. LEWIN: I know. But I still think, Judge, since it came up, that throughout that period of time, quite frankly, we were on the same team in trying to identify him and get him into court to be presented quickly. Whether something happened at BOP or not, we don't have a position on. But I will say that he was held from Wednesday night until Monday. And, again, was not able to speak to me until Friday.

Judge, this 35 days is somewhat unique. Look, not all defendants, but most defendants, are held in one place. Most defendants are able to have visitors. Most defendants are able to have phone calls with their family. They're able to have legal visits. Most defendants in pretrial detention have a general sense of when they will be presented and offered the opportunity for bail. Ibrahim had none of this. Ibrahim's family had none of this. There were days and sometimes more than a week where nobody knew where Ibrahim was.

THE COURT: What about consular notification, did that -- did that occur?

MR. LEWIN: Consular notification was made while he was in Alexandria.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. LEWIN: But, Judge, I do think this is relevant as Your Honor is considering what -- what, if any, additional penalties to impose to consider this was not just 35 days in jail. This was, quite frankly, a unique period of 35 days, made unique both by his inability to talk to people, his inability to have visitors, his status in solitary confinement and, quite frankly, his inability to meet with either his lawyer or his family for much of that time.

I want to shift now, Judge, to talk about the period of time since his release.

He's been released for about four months of bail. We'd submit respectfully that his period of bail, his period out on bail, this four months, is actually quite unlike that of most defendants.

So, first, the last time Ibrahim saw his wife or his daughters was on June 27th when he was, frankly, led away and arrested in front of them.

Ibrahim's father has come here and been with him here in New York since he was released on bail on the 1st.

And his mother, who has come in recent days, traveled to be with him during this extraordinarily stressful time leading up to sentencing.

I'll note that his mother, Ms. (indiscernible), has numerous health issues including diabetes and a cardiac condition that make travel and, frankly, these proceedings particularly difficult.

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Other than that, Judge, for the last four months, since August 1st, Ibrahim has not had one single in-person social interaction. He doesn't have a single friend in New York. He doesn't have a family member other than his parents who've been here with him in New York. He doesn't have a professional colleague in New York. He's not been able to work. He has had neither social nor professional opportunities at all. He's been in a city in which he has no connections waiting to go through this process. Again, he's out. He's not incarcerated.

This is not a sob story, but it is truly a unique experience when compared to most defendants who when given bail are able to resume at least certain aspects of their personal or professional lives and Ibrahim had none for over -- and we can address this to the extent Your Honor wants to address a fine -- on housing alone, over this four-month period, his family has personally spent more than \$30,000 on various short-term housing, sometimes as short as a week, in both Manhattan or Brooklyn.

And when you factor in travel expenses, that number increases substantially, travel expenses for Ibrahim's father

and mother to be here.

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Again, Your Honor, as with the duration of his time spent in pretrial detention, where we ask you to consider the nature of that 35 days, we also ask you to consider the nature of his essentially four months on bail and how it differs from many defendants that Your Honor may sentence and the bail that they experience.

THE COURT: What are his release conditions?

MR. LEWIN: Well, first let me note, Judge, that he has scrupulously followed all of the conditions of his pretrial release, which include travel restrictions, his travel has been restricted to the City of New York and the Eastern District of New York, but my belief is that he has never left Manhattan or Brooklyn.

He has GPS monitoring. He's had an ankle bracelet the entire time. He has been forbidden to be on social media or his email, so he has not even had contact with use of his email. He's had contact with family, which was permitted by Pretrial Services that's supervising him. But those are the principle conditions of his pretrial release, Judge.

THE COURT: Okay. But not home detention or curfew?

MR. LEWIN: He did not have a curfew. He also had nothing to do during that time period.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. LEWIN: Judge, third, I said I'd like to address immigration. Many defendants obviously face collateral immigration consequences as a result of a conviction and Ibrahim is one of them.

So, first, as Your Honor has already observed,

Ibrahim's conviction will result in his immediate removal and
likely permanent bar from ever reentering the United States.

Ibrahim has spent about 17 years of his life between childhood and his recent studies in the United States. So he's 42 now and he's spent about 17 of his 42 years living in the United States. And so that's not an insignificant collateral consequence, a permanent bar, but it's also admittedly, Judge, not uncommon. This happens.

It's a collateral consequence that people face if they choose to violate the law of the United States of America and they're not citizens. So I get that.

I think more importantly there's a second consequence and a third consequence.

The second is that all three of his young daughters are U.S. Citizens. Should any one of them decide in the future that they want to move here temporarily, for example, to study as Ibrahim did, as Ibrahim's other family members, as Ibrahim's father did, he will not be able to visit them. Should they choose to move here more permanently, he will never, likely never, be able to visit them. That's not an

insignificant consequence for a man who has three U.S. citizen daughters under the age five years old.

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I think Ibrahim's immigration status and imminent removal could have a more immediate effect on him as a direct result of Your Honor's sentencing decision.

As I know Your Honor knows, removal, deportation, operates differently depending on whether Ibrahim is sentenced on one hand to time served, which is what we believe is the only just sentence, or is sentenced to even a day in prison.

If Ibrahim is sentenced to time served, he has two weeks to self remove. Self removal means he has to buy a plane ticket and fly home with his parents.

Frankly, Judge, we expect, and we've spoken to the prosecutor, who's been great, the passport is arriving tomorrow. We expect him to leave in substantially less than two weeks if Your Honor sentences him to what we submit is the appropriate sentence of time served.

THE COURT: When you say the passport is arriving tomorrow, you mean being returned?

MR. LEWIN: To the prosecutor, not to us.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. LEWIN: To the prosecutor in the event that Your Honor sentences him to a sentence (inaudible).

THE COURT: Who has it now though? The clerk's

office?

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2 MR. LEWIN: It's my understanding, and I'll let Ms.
3 Winik address it, that the FBI --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. LEWIN: -- and probably WFO in Washington, DC likely had it until very recently.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. LEWIN: But the point I want to make is if Your Honor, and I think Your Honor understands this, but if Your Honor sentences Ibrahim to time served, he will self deport. He will get on a plane and he will leave this country and he will likely never return no matter what his daughters choose to do.

If Your Honor, on the other hand, sentences Ibrahim to even a day of additional prison time, he cannot self remove. Rather, on completion of his sentence, he will be transferred into ICE immigration custody.

So I assume, and won't go into any detail, that

Your Honor is familiar with the conditions of immigration

custody, both overcrowding and the under resourced nature of

ICE detention custody.

But more importantly, Ibrahim is likely to spend substantial additional time incarcerated pending deportation if Your Honor sentences him to even an additional one day in prison. The data, the most recent data, we could find is of

2019 where countrywide individuals were held in ICE custody for an average of 55 days. I don't think it's improved since 2019. So the average nationwide of ICE custody is 50 to 5 days.

But more importantly, and more directly, of the ten immigration facilities that have the longest periods of detention, of the ten facilities, ICE immigration facilities, most of which are country jails on contract, four of them are in New York City. The New York City metropolitan area I should say. The four of them, Orange County, New York, Essex County, New Jersey, Bergen County, New Jersey and Hudson County.

Orange County, New York is 107 days on average. So that's how long people on average spend in ICE detention.

The lowest is Hudson County, New Jersey which is 88 days.

So, Judge, if Your Honor determines to sentence

Ibrahim to even a day of additional time in prison, it could

likely keep him incarcerated for between two and four

additional months in already overcrowded ICE immigration

detention centers.

So, Judge, just briefly to sum up, and then I'll move on to his attempts to atone or make right what he did.

He's already experienced substantial consequences, jail, bail and immigration, and will continue to face substantial consequences for his conduct. Many of those

consequences, though admittedly not all, are somewhat unique to Ibrahim.

So now I'll turn briefly to what Ibrahim did to atone or attempt to essentially make up for his conduct.

So, first, Judge, he immediately, through counsel, made attempts to cooperate with the Government and plead guilty.

We, as his lawyers, raised the desire for and willingness to discuss a quick resolution that would include a guilty plea beginning in mid July. So, Judge, that was about two weeks before he even arrived in the MDC in Brooklyn at the end of July. We first started, based on our conversations with Ibrahim, engaging in conversations with the Government about resolution.

By early August, quite literally days after his arrival in EDNY, we conveyed our willingness for Ibrahim to sit for interviews and answer questions. Days later, by mid August, we had agreed that Ibrahim would sit -- would, in fact, sit for an interview as part of resolution to this matter.

Here, Judge, I just want to pause for a moment and make clear that this was never an attempt to affirmatively cooperate and get a 5K1.1 letter. This is not a case of failed cooperation. That was not what was discussed with the Government at any point in time. This is not failed

cooperation.

The discussion was reaching a resolution pursuant to which Ibrahim comes in and answers questions about his conduct, and ultimately that's exactly what he did. About his conduct, about his relationships. He spent about four and a half hours in the first interview and two and a half hours in the second interview in early September providing information to the Government.

THE COURT: But to the extent you're comfortable doing so, I wonder if you could say more about what you mean. You said he wasn't seeking to cooperate in the 5K sense of the word cooperation, but you did start by saying that he decided immediately to plead guilty and cooperate.

And what does cooperation mean in this context?

The Government even was fairly oblique on that subject.

MR. LEWIN: I think I hopefully can clarify this for Your Honor.

What cooperation means is that the Government had concerns. They were concerned about whether Ibrahim was acting as an agent of a foreign government. They had concerns about how many other messages were out there. They had concerns about some of his relationships with other people, whether he was taking direction from other people.

And so we engaged in discussions in which I think it was clear -- and, again, if Ms. Winik wants to

characterize this differently, that's really fine -- but I think it was agreed that they wanted to get some assurances. They wanted to understand some of the facts better directly from Ibrahim.

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We did an attorney proffer and they wanted to hear from him about his relationships, about whether he was taking direction from anyone else on these subjects.

And essentially the negotiations were if he comes in and you determine him to be truthful about all -- about material matters that we would at least conceptually reach the agreement that we, in fact, reached, Judge, which is a plea agreement with the guidelines, the appropriate guidelines, of zero to six months and an acknowledgment that a sentence of time served, given his cooperation, given --

THE COURT: You keep saying cooperation, but the cooperation essentially boils down to him sitting down with the Government to tell them that he's not guilty of more serious offences --

MR. LEWIN: But as Your Honor knows --

THE COURT: -- or working for other people.

MR. LEWIN: I apologize.

THE COURT: No, go ahead.

MR. LEWIN: I apologize.

THE COURT: No.

MR. LEWIN: As Your Honor knows, in national

security cases, just sitting down with the Government and answering questions, the Government getting that information, understanding what happened, understanding what didn't happen, being able to ask unlimited questions, is actually extraordinarily significant. This is not --

THE COURT: I'm not -- sorry to cut you off. I agree that it has significance. I'm not saying it has no significance. I'm just saying it's not what we typically think of as cooperation.

MR. LEWIN: So may I should -- fair -- I should say lower case C cooperation. What I mean is a willingness to come in, to sit for, in this case, approximately seven hours of questioning and to answer every question. Questions about relationships, about other people, about his activities, about his background, about why he sent these messages, about the people to whom he sent these messages.

So when I say cooperation, to speak colloquially, I mean lower case C cooperation. I mean providing information that the FBI wants and the Eastern District of New York U.S. Attorney's Office wanted to get information about. Some of that related to this case.

Frankly, Judge, I won't go into detail because, again, some of this was submitted under seal, but some of that related to other cases and he answered those questions.

And ultimately the Government essentially agreed to the

bargain that we struck, which is what we are here on today, which is a guilty plea to a count of 1001.

THE COURT: Understood.

MR. LEWIN: I will -- I will not try to summarize

Ibrahim's remorse. He has -- will, in his own words, sort of describe it for you.

But I think it's fair to say that he is genuinely remorseful, particularly for the effect that his words had on other people.

I think the recognition of which perhaps wasn't clear to him, as it isn't clear to many people who anonymously fling things out into the social media universe without thinking about it and do so over a long period of time. Again, I'll let him speak for himself.

Judge, for all these reasons, a sentence of time served is, we believe, the only, the only just and appropriate sentence.

We're all familiar with the 3553(a) factors. I won't go through them. I'll make five brief points which I've already hit.

First, Ibrahim's guidelines are an offense level 4 which is firmly inside the zero to six- month range. Indeed, Judge, you could double his offense level and he would still be in the zero to six-month range.

The Government has agreed that a sentence of time

served may well be appropriate.

Second, Ibrahim has no prior convictions. And this conduct, while undoubtedly and painfully serious, is actually aberrational in a life that was otherwise well lived and will, I assure you, in the future be well lived.

He stands before you as a person who has already experienced, and who will in the future experience, substantial consequences for his conduct, including that he's already served more than a month in multiple jails around the country, four months on bail but unable to work, socialize or be with his family.

He will, in the future, be forever barred likely from re-entering this country, even though his three U.S.

Citizen daughters are citizens of the United States and could well choose to live here briefly or permanently.

Judge, these consequences that he has already faced adequately, and I would say even powerfully reflect, both the seriousness of the offense that Ibrahim committed and clearly promote both specific deterrence, which the government has acknowledged it does not believe Ibrahim will ever, ever commit this conduct again, and general deterrence.

This has been well covered in the media and people know that these sorts of lies and this sort of conduct is simply not tolerated by the Government.

Fourth, Ibrahim has taken substantial steps since

being charged to take responsibility, including quickly conveying a willingness to enter a guilty plea and sitting for six hours of interviews or seven hours of interviews with the government.

And we think, respectfully, Judge, that a sentence of time served, which would be more than a month in jail, would be consistent with other sentences and would avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities.

So, in sum, Ibrahim has learned his lesson. Anyone who is watching has no doubt about how serious the United States government takes this conduct. Time served is a just sentence and we urge Your Honor to impose that sentence and to permit Ibrahim to return home and try to restart his life with his wife and his young daughters.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. LEWIN: Thank you, Judge.

THE COURT: For the government?

MS. WINIK: Your Honor, is it okay if I stay seated to speak into the microphone?

THE COURT: It is.

MS. WINIK: Your Honor, the government respectfully submits that a guideline sentence here, which includes also the sentence of the 35 days the defendant already spent in custody, and his agreement to be removed from the country immediately following any sentence is sufficient, but not

greater than necessary to serve the goals of sentencing here.

As the Government sentencing submission lays out, and a victim we'll hear form later will explain, as well as the victim impact statement, a second victim included in the Government's submission, the defendant's conduct was incredibly serious and has significant real effects on real people's lives. The victim will speak about it better than I can today.

But in addition to the two victims the Court will hear from, there's numerous other victims who did not want to speak in court today, but who the Government met with. Many of these victims are mostly women who escaped persecution by the Saudi government and fled for what they believed was a better life outside Saudi Arabia, in a place where they could advocate openly for human rights and equality.

But despite escaping the Saudi government, they were continuously threatened and harassed by the defendant who was receiving his education in the United States paid for by the Saudi government.

The defendant knew his threats were wrong, which is why he repeatedly lied to the FBI about it. These are serious conduct and should be sentenced seriously.

The Government believes, however, that the consequences of this criminal conviction and the defendant's agreement to be removed from the United States has

specifically deterred the defendant from future online harassment.

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And I want to talk briefly about the Court's question at our last status conference about whether the defendant acted on behalf of a foreign government that came up earlier today.

Nine, five, one, which is acting as an agent of a foreign government, requires -- is a very technical charge that requires an agreement to act subject to the direction and control of a foreign government.

As the Government complaint explained in its sentencing submission, the defendant worked for the Saudi government before coming to the United States. The Saudi government paid for his education. The defendant's father is high up in the Saudi government. And the defendant will be employed by the Saudi government when he returns to Saudi Arabia in a position yet to be fully determined by the Saudi government.

The Government isn't prepared to argue or present evidence that the defendant acted at the direction of a Saudi government official when he threatened the dissidents in this case and harassed them online or when he lied to the FBI, but we've pointed out the defendant's strong connection to the Saudi government since it's directly relevant to the charges here.

The defendant's connection to the Saudi government makes his threats to dissidents that more significant and that more real.

When the defendant --

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THE COURT: Does it even matter if he's acting specifically at the direction of a, you know, "Handler or supervisor" in the Saudi government?

And the reason I ask that is because let's say we all took it as a given for purposes of argument that he was working on behalf of the Saudi government to harass dissidents who were criticizing the Saudi government's policies, it's not apparent to me what he might do differently under those circumstances.

MS. WINIK: Your Honor, I agree with you. I think the question is you had asked earlier do we have evidence that could support a charge of 951 or acting at the direction of, and the answer is we don't, Your Honor. What we do have is someone with very strong Saudi ties engaging in this conduct, which is why we've laid it out for the Court in our complaint and in the sentencing submission.

So when the defendant says to a dissident I'm going to teach you a lesson or do you think you'll be safe here, it's not just someone sitting on a couch in their basement texting that. It's somebody with incredibly strong Saudi government ties texting that.

So we just want to -- I just wanted to provide the Court with the explanation that you asked for at the last status conference.

THE COURT: While we're on the subject of other crimes that the Government might have considered for one reason or another, what about anything in Title 18 that relates to the transmission of threats of violence by internet communications?

MS. WINIK: I don't want to provide a not-full answer. I will say that a lot of the defendant's victims were out of venue, so not within the Eastern District of New York.

THE COURT: Okay. But at least one of them was in the Eastern District of New York?

MS. WINIK: Yes, Your Honor. And we'll hear from that victim today.

But that was the thought process into the Government's charging decision at that time.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. WINIK: But when we're talking about the sentencing factors here, I believe the Court should consider the seriousness of the offense, his conduct over a long period of time, but also the purposes of sentencing. And at least some of those purposes in terms of specific deterrence have been met the Government believes in this case.

Unless the Court has further questions for the Government, I'd like to give the opportunity to one of the victims to speak.

THE COURT: Please.

(Pause.)

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MS. al-MAYOUF:: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MS. al-MAYOUF: My name is Danah al-Mayouf. I'm referred to in this indictment as Victim 5.

I have a platform in social media and I believed I can use it to advocate for women's rights and freedom of belief in Saudi Arabia.

I have used Twitter, Instagram and my YouTube channel as a tool to translate politically banned books in the kingdom.

I used to work in customer service jobs, including grocery store cashier, bank teller, and technical and customer support. In this line of work, I did deal with people directly most of the time. I also did some photography on the side in hopes of making it a full-time job when I built a client base.

As an activist, I'm subjected to kidnap, rape and death threats but what I believe are agents who work for the Saudi government.

Because my jobs required me meet in person with

strangers, I'm constantly fearful and extremely cautious when these interactions occur. In 2017, I was stopped before by someone who is pro the Saudi government, which made me stop meeting potential clients in person.

I thought it would be over, but with Ibrahim sending messages, using the account he had from the FBI to ask to meet me in person, while he was threatening and verbally abusing other girls with the same account, it made me realize that I am not safe, and stalking -- and the stalking and luring attempt would never stop until I'm either dead or kidnapped.

For every Saudi dissident and activist, the Khashoggi murder in October 2018 was a threat you are next.

It was in December 2019, when Ibrahim's luring attempt happened. He claimed he has information that could help me make -- that could help make me win what I believe is a frivolous lawsuit filed against me which I suspect is funded by the Saudi government to put me through mental and financial anguish. So I wanted to meet him in person so bad, but I also -- but I was also scared for my safety.

I eventually decided not to go after consulting my lawyer and instead I reported it to the FBI. Had I met him then, I don't know if I would be here today making this statement.

This constant fear for my life and safety, and the

stresses that I deal with daily, exacerbated my anxiety and triggered my OCD which is impacting my life greatly. I'm always looking over my shoulder. I have nightmares, the same exact nightmares are shared by many Saudi woman who live abroad and are scared for their lives because they oppose the Saudi government.

I still don't feel safe. I don't turn on the AC or the heater while I am alone in the bedroom so I can be aware of all the sounds in my surrounding. Any sound near the door, like the sound of our neighbor unlocking his door, terrifies me. All this is happening while I am on American soil.

Ibrahim claims the Saudi government did not order him to make these statements and he made them out of love and dedication to his country and its leadership.

I want Ibrahim to reflect on what loving your country is. Does he love his country more by verbally abusing, threatening, and luring victims of that oppressive leadership, suppressing the freedom of speech and targeting activists, or do I love my country any less by wanting the best for its people and wanting leaders to be held accountable.

Government change and new leadership takes over, but the lands and the people will not. We activists choose to fight for our country and our people and not for the

oppressors in the government who are only looking after their 1 2 personal interests. 3 I don't want what happened to me to ever happen again to me or to anyone else. Protect us by protecting our 4 5 freedom of speech. Thank you. THE COURT: Thank you. Thank you. 6 Thank you. I have nothing further, 7 MS. WINIK: Your Honor. 8 9 THE COURT: And no second person? MS. WINIK: Just the letter that was attached to 10 the Government's --11 THE COURT: All right. I'm happy to hear from Mr. 12 Alhussayen now and also happy to take a five-minute break if 13 14 you would prefer that beforehand. 15 MR. LEWIN: Can we take a five-minute break, Judge, 16 and then allow --17 THE COURT: Let's take a five-minute break and then 18 I think we'll push through after that. 19 MR. LEWIN: Great. Thank you. 20 THE COURT: Thank you. 21 (Recess from 4:34 p.m. until 4:39 p.m.) 22 THE COURT: Are we all here? Okay. 23 I have a quick question for the Government before 24 we proceed to hear from the defendant. 25 Do you know if Instagram is available in Saudi

Arabia?

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MS. WINIK: My understanding, Your Honor, is that it is just because I know the defendant informed the Government that he posted on Instagram from Saudi Arabia, but that's the basis of my knowledge.

THE COURT: Okay. Is there, to ask a more general question, any reason why a campaign of harassment like this one could be conducted more effectively from U.S. soil than from Saudi Arabia?

MS. WINIK: Your Honor, I can speculate. I don't know if my answer --

THE COURT: I can speculate too. Yeah. Maybe other users can see the location of the person who's messaging them or maybe they can't.

MS. WINIK: Just from my own personal knowledge of Instagram, I don't believe, unless you tab a photograph saying in a certain location.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. WINIK: I mean, I certainly think that while we have a broad news world where you can access news from anywhere, you're certainly, you know, able to more easily access American-based or English-based news from the U.S. But, again, I'd just be speculating.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Thank you.

Mr. Alhussayen?

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THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.

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Your Honor, I stand before deeply humbled and embarrassed by my actions that I have led me here today.

I want it to be clear, I am totally and solely responsible for my conduct. No one asked, direct, or even suggest that I take these actions. I did this all by myself.

As you know, I lied to federal agents three different times about my social media accounts. Each time I did not disclose all of the accounts that I controlled, including with the user name samer16419.

I did this because I was embarrassed. I was embarrassed about the content and language that I had used in messages sent from the accounts. The messages are not appropriate and they are certainly not appropriate for someone as educated as I'm lucky enough to be.

I also did not know why the agents were interested in my social media and thought it would be enough to give them the accounts that I used most -- that I used most often. This was wrong. Lying to the FBI is a serious crime and I will never do it again.

As for the Samer account, I set up this account to post my political views. I sent messages to people who I disagreed with about Saudi politics and social issues.

Your Honor, I would like to say that I love my country and support my country, but I now know clearly that

this is not the way or the method of expressing that love and support.

I still disagree with these individuals, but the way I disagreed with them was wrong. I sent messages that mocked them and with a controversial language because I wanted to provoke them. I wanted to get a reaction. I did not -- I did not intend to hurt them, but I should have known better. I should have known that my words could hurt, could be threatened, could make people scared.

I know that they did and I want to speak directly to those who I hurt. I'm deeply sorry and ask for forgiveness.

I lastly want to say to my family I feel an immense amount of guilt for what they have had to experience. My wife and children were confused and scared when I was arrested at the airport.

After they couldn't speak to me for weeks, and even after my release, they have to live without me for over four months. My children still do not know why I'm not home. I have not been there for them and that is my fault. I'm ashamed by what I have done to them.

Your Honor, I want to be a good role model to my children. The actions that led me here, lying to the FBI, sending these type of messages, are not how I want them to know me.

You can be certain that nothing like this will ever happen again. I promise to work every day for the rest of my life to grow into the best person that I can be. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Okay. Okay. So as is my obligation, I've spent a fair amount of time considering the relevant factors set out by the United States Congress at 18 U.S. Code, Section 3553(a). Those include the advisory sentencing guidelines range and a number of other factors that I'll mention momentarily. I've considered them to ensure that I impose a sentence that is sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes of sentencing, as is my obligation in every case, sufficient, but not greater than necessary.

The purposes of sentencing under federal law includes the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the crime, to promote respect for the law, to provide just punishment for the offense, and to deter criminal conduct both by this defendant and also to deter others who might seek to engage in this type of crime in the future.

I've also considered, as is my obligation, the nature and circumstances of this offense and the history and characteristics of this defendant.

My practice at sentencing is to talk about what I

see as the aggravating factors in a given case. Those are the factors that would call for a higher sentence all things being equal, and then to discuss the mitigating factors, which are those that would call for a lower sentence, all things being equal.

The Government opened by calling this case incredibly serious. I agree with that characterization.

Mr. Alhussayen has been convicted of violating 18 U.S.C., Section 1001, which is a crime that is not typically thought of as being among being credibly serious statutes in Title 18.

But in this case, Mr. Alhussayen lied repeatedly over an extended period of time, so we're not talking about a momentary or reflexive denial by somebody who's put on the spot in a way they don't expect to be and the crime is over essentially as soon as it begins.

Here we have a series of meetings, again, over a period of months, a period of many months, in which the defendant lies repeatedly.

He's a well-educated man. He comes from means and a high stratum of Saudi society. He's a former government employee, as the complaint indicates. And he's sending messages that I don't want to be euphemistic about here.

We have, to some degree, skirted the nature of the threatening messages themselves, talked about how people get

overheated on the internet, which is surely true. Everybody gets overheated inappropriately from time to time in their lives and says things that they later regret, but that's not what we're talking about here.

And at the risk of introducing some vulgarity into this proceeding, I want to just acknowledge some of the messages that are set forth in the Government's sentencing submission.

And the purpose of me doing this is to leave absolutely no doubt in the minds of everyone here today that this is not just a question of overheated or inappropriate rhetoric or of making statements that one realizes later were inappropriate.

This is a coordinated campaign to put the recipients of these messages in fear, including in fear of violence.

So on July 15th of this year, Mr. Alhussayen says to Victim No. 4, do you think you're going to be safe here?

On September 18th, he tells Victim No. 5 that he is going to, quote, "Kick your ass."

And next message, next day, I'm going to teach you a lesson. Same day, we will discipline you. Same day, soon I will know where you are and get you, bitch. Same day, fine, go ahead and make fun of me. Let me see how smart you are when we get our hands on you. Same day, you'll see,

bitch, who is going to do as he pleases. Same day, I swear I will not let you be. Same day, see what happened to Amal al-Asmari. Same day, MBS will wipe you off the face of the earth. You will see.

Next message, I will teach you a lesson. Next message, you will face the same fate as Amal al-Asmari. And remember what I said, be careful and do not cross your boundaries. This is the last time I see you do this.

In 2019, the defendant sends Victim No. 6 the messages attempting to set up a meeting and indicating that he knew where Victim No. 6 was located.

So this conduct went on for an extended period of time.

I mentioned in the colloquy with the lawyers here what I see as two of the most serious interactions, one where Mr. Alhussayen is asking for a face-to-face meeting with one of the recipients of these messages, and another in which he sends a photograph of an elderly relative to that victim. I don't think there's any reasonable way to understand that message other than as threatening the safety of the recipient's family member.

And as everybody here has indicated, especially the Government, the fact that Mr. Alhussayen lied to the FBI on multiple occasions about the ownership of the account in question is of course an indication that he understood the

severity of his conduct.

There's some dispute back and forth about whether the defendant lied to the Government or was less than forthcoming to the Government about the whereabouts of another phone that he held. I understand we're not perhaps going to get to the bottom of that question here today and so I will not rely on it for purposes of the sentence I impose here.

What I will say, Mr. Alhussayen, is that this conduct I don't think it's an exaggeration to say actually undermines a key pillar of the American promise. This country is welcoming to immigrants. Perhaps if you look at the numbers, more welcoming of immigrants than any other country in the world year in and year out.

And one key part of the welcome package is the message that you will be able to speak your mind freely in this country. I say that exact phrase on a regular basis to new citizens who are being naturalized in this very building. And I don't have to tell anybody here that given the freedoms of speech, communication and travel in this country, the United States has long been viewed as a safe harbor of sorts for dissidents fleeing repression in other places.

When foreign nationals harass dissidents in their home countries, that's one thing. But it's another thing entirely to travel here and threaten people for their

political and social views while standing on U.S. soil. And that to me is the key part of my obligation today.

I mentioned the Court's obligations at sentencing, and to my mind one of the key factors is the general deterrence factor, specific deterrence means the aspiration that the sentence that I impose here will deter you, Mr. Alhussayen, from engaging in this type of conduct again in the future.

Your attorneys have been extremely eloquent on your behalf, and I think make a persuasive case that the risk of you personally engaging in this type of conduct again in the future is low given what you've been through in this court case, but we're seeing a substantial frequency, a substantial number of incidents of campaigns of harassment carried out by foreign nationals on U.S. soil in recent years.

There were Southern District indictments in the last several months I believe alleging that the Republic of Iran targeted a Brooklyn journalist among other people.

There are multiple criminal charges that have been brought this year and in the last several years arising out of efforts by the People's Republic of China in this district and elsewhere to harass dissidents.

And this is happening often enough apparently that the FBI has actually attached a name to the practice, that name being Transnational Repression.

This is extremely, extremely serious conduct, and it is incumbent on me, I think, that the sentence I impose today sends a message that crimes committed in the course of such harassment will be taken seriously.

So those are the aggravating factors.

On the mitigating side of the spectrum, I do think it's somewhat meaningful that Mr. Alhussayen agreed immediately to plead guilty to the 1001 violation.

I think it is somewhat meaningful, as I indicated earlier, that he agreed to meet and speak with the Government about the conduct at issue, although the Government has taken the position, as I've mentioned, that he lied at least one of those proffer sessions about the whereabouts of an electronic device that the Government wanted to put its hands on. Point one.

And more generally and more importantly, point two, you know, I'm not suggesting anybody should cooperate against other people that they don't have a basis to cooperate against, but I will say I think it stretches the word cooperation beyond its usual boundaries in this courthouse to say that the defendant even attempted to cooperate against other people, as I understand the record.

Again, all that having been said, it is meaningful and it will affect in Mr. Alhussayen's favor the sentence that I impose today that he agreed expeditiously to plead

guilty, that he consented to removal, and so forth.

And I do believe it's meaningful that he has spent 34 days in jail so far. The picture that Mr. Lewin paints of that time in jail indicates that that 34 or 35, depending on how we count, days were maybe the equivalent of substantially more time in better circumstances.

So those are the factors that would favor a lower sentence in this case.

The United States Sentencing Guidelines provide a range of imprisonment, as I mentioned before, of zero to six months. The plea agreement calls for a range of imprisonment between zero to six months. And Mr. Alhussayen has already served, if we give him the benefit of the doubt on that extra day, 35 days in pretrial detention.

The defense is asking on that basis for a sentence of time served.

I don't believe, however, that a sentence of time served would be sufficient to convey the message that I think is required for general deterrence, as I mentioned earlier, and I don't believe a sentence of time served would be sufficient to recognize the severity of the offense conduct at issue here.

It's a little bit -- well, let me say that differently.

The Government, I think, has already accounted for

many of what I'm describing as the mitigating factors in the -- in extending the plea offer that they extended here.

I think to say that a sentence of time served is appropriate would go too far for me.

And so after assessing the particular facts of this case, and in light of the relevant Section 3553(a) factors, I sentence Mr. Alhussayen to 60 days, 6-0 days, in the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons.

I also will order that upon release from imprisonment Mr. Alhussayen shall be on supervised release for a term of one year and I'll impose certain special conditions to go with that term of supervised release in a moment.

But I want to be clear, and we will be clear in the judgment, that I am not directing that the term of supervised release be served in the United States. And my imposition of a term of supervised release should not function to impede or delay what would otherwise be the expeditious removal or deportation of the defendant.

In terms of special conditions, number one, Mr.

Alhussayen may not reenter the United States illegally. And number two, Mr. Alhussayen shall cooperate with and abide by all instructions of the immigration authorities.

I find that these conditions are reasonably related to the nature and circumstances of the offense, the history

and characteristics of the defendant, the need to afford adequate deterrence, the need to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant, and the need to provide correctional treatment in the most effective manner.

Forfeiture is not applicable in this case.

In terms of a fine, does defense want to be heard on the subject of Mr. Alhussayen's ability to pay a fine?

And if you do want to be heard, would you mind pulling the microphone a bit closer to you.

MR. LEWIN: I stood only to ask if I could have a minute to consult with my client?

THE COURT: Yeah. Please.

(Pause.)

(Pause.)

THE COURT: And just to give everybody a preview of the question that will come shortly, I will have questions for the Government about whether you have a view on Mr.

Alhussayen's continuation on bail or his remand? And if the former, whether you would seek any change to the conditions of his release. But we'll get there when we get there.

MR. LEWIN: Judge, with respect to a fine, we'd only point out that Ibrahim is a student, has been a student for the last ten years. His family has already spent -- he has not spent -- his family has spent an additional over \$30,000 simply on housing costs alone.

We think that Your Honor has imposed a significant sentence of incarceration that clearly sends a message. And a fine for a student who's been a student for ten years would have a significant impact and is not necessary here particularly in light of the out-of-pocket costs that his family has already incurred.

And, Judge, if I might, with respect, may I address the second point Your Honor made just in advance?

We would -- I believe we've discussed this and asked that Ibrahim be permitted to self surrender by the end of this week. I believe we have agreement on that, but we'll let Ms. Winik describe that.

THE COURT: To self surrender to the marshals, to the MDC? Where would you --

MR. LEWIN: Wherever he's directed to self surrender, he will self surrender, Judge. And we'd just ask for him -- he will probably surrender before then, but to have a day or two to get his affairs in order before he serves his sentence.

THE COURT: Okay. And my question for the Government will be just whether that works logistically speaking?

I doubt that the Bureau of Prisons would be in a position to designate him to a particular facility by the end of this week. And so whatever I'm going to order, it has to

1 be something that works --2 MR. LEWIN: Of course, Judge. THE COURT: -- with the system we have. But we'll 3 take that question up in a bit. 5 MR. LEWIN: Yes, Judge. THE COURT: On the subject of a fine, you know, I 6 don't believe I'm in a position to make a finding that the 7 defendant lacks the ability to pay a fine. 8 9 He, I understand, has been a student, but by all 10 indications, including from the defense, he will be gainfully 11 employed when he returns to Saudi Arabia working for the 12 Saudi government, and so I will impose a fine that is at or 13 about the mid point of the quidelines fine range here of \$4,000 U.S. dollars. 14 15 Restitution is not applicable in this case. 16 that correct? 17 MS. WINIK: Yes, Your Honor. 18 THE COURT: Okay. I also must by law impose a 19 special assessment of \$100 and I do that now. 20 I find this sentence is sufficient, but not greater 21 than necessary, again, to comply with the purposes of 22 sentencing. 23 Let me turn next to the removal order. So I've reviewed the Government's proposed order of 24

removal. As I mentioned earlier, the Government has

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both with the concurrence of immigration and customs
enforcement and also on consent of Mr. Alhussayen himself.

Maybe I can just ask the Government to, just for the sake of the record, describe the basis, the statutory basis, for the judicial removal order at this point.

MS. WINIK: Yes, Your Honor.

Before I do that, if you don't mind going back for a moment.

THE COURT: Please.

MS. WINIK: Could a condition of the supervised release be for the defendant to not contact any of the victims that are listed in Attachment A of his plea agreement for the one year of his supervised release?

THE COURT: Does defense want to be hard on that condition?

MR. LEWIN: No, Judge.

THE COURT: Okay. Then, yes, I will also make a special condition of the defendant's release, supervised release, that he not contact any of the victims named.

I'm sorry. Tell me where this list of victims
appears?

MS. WINIK: It's attached to the plea agreement, Attachment A of the plea agreement.

THE COURT: Listed in Attachment A of the plea

1 agreement. And that attachment contains actual names? 2 3 MS. WINIK: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. So there's not going to be any5 --4 MS. WINIK: I can check. 6 7 THE COURT: I just want to make clear -- I want the record to be clear --8 MS. WINIK: Your Honor, names --9 THE COURT: -- that Mr. Alhussayen knows exactly 10 who he's not supposed to be contacting. 11 MS. WINIK: Names and Instagram handles. 12 MR. LEWIN: And, Judge, for the record, we've 13 reviewed the list. He's aware of the list. He's aware of 14 15 his obligation both pursuant to the plea agreement and 16 pursuant to Your Honor's special condition just imposed that 17 he may not contact these people. 18 THE COURT: Okay. So, yes, I order that condition 19 as well I think for obvious reasons given the nature of the 20 conduct we've been discussing for the last couple of hours 21 now. And the judgment will reflect that as well. 22 Did the Government want to say a word or two about 23 the statutory basis for the judicial order of removal? 24 MS. WINIK: Yes. 2.5 According to Section 237(a)(2)(A)(I), which was

amended by 8 U.S.C., Section 1227(a)(2)(A)(I), the defendant has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude committed within five years after the admission for which a sentence of one year longer may be imposed.

The defendant is not a citizen of the United

States. And upon his agreement has agreed to be removed from
the United States after his term of imprisonment.

THE COURT: Does the defense agree with that characterization?

MR. LEWIN: We do, Judge.

THE COURT: Okay. And, Mr. Lewin, let me just ask you for the sake of the record, have you had an adequate opportunity to discuss the plea statement that your client signed with him in advance of his having signed it?

MR. LEWIN: Yes, Judge. We're talking about the judicial order of removal, correct?

THE COURT: I'm referring to something that I see described --

MR. LEWIN: Defendant's plea statement in support of judicial removal, we have, Judge.

THE COURT: $\mbox{--}$ yes, as a plea statement by the defendant.

MR. LEWIN: We've discussed it. We've had it translated. I believe he understands it and signed it knowingly.

1 THE COURT: Okay.

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Mr. Alhussayen, do you have any questions about the plea statement that you signed?

THE DEFENDANT: No, Your Honor. I don't have.

THE COURT: Can you confirm that that is, in fact, your signature on the plea statement?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And did you have an adequate opportunity to discuss that with your attorney before you signed it?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And you understood the rights you would be giving up when you signed it?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do.

THE COURT: Okay. And you've said you have no other questions about the plea statement or the proposed order of removal at this time, is that correct?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. So based on the submissions and stipulations of the parties, I do so order the order of judicial removal pursuant to 8 U.S. Code, Section 1228.

As previously stated, but let me just state it again for the sake of completeness, the term of supervised release does not need to be served in the United States and should not delay Mr. Alhussayen's removal to Saudi Arabia

1 following the term of imprisonment that I have imposed.

Are there any underlying charging instruments that need to be dismissed here? I don't think so.

MS. WINIK: No, Your Honor. There was just a complaint.

THE COURT: Okay. Any further discussion to be had about other matters, pending requests to seal anything or otherwise?

MS. WINIK: Not at this time, Your Honor.

I would ask for one moment to confer with defense counsel about surrender.

THE COURT: Please.

(Pause.)

MS. WINIK: Your Honor, the Government consents to having the defendant self surrender by Friday.

In terms of logistics of where he'd go, I don't know the answer to that, but I will find that out, confirm with defense counsel, and if the Court would like an update, I can provide the Court that as well.

THE COURT: I would like an update and in a way that even more importantly puts the defendant on notice that where he's supposed to be.

I think it's the case, from maybe remote experience, that with the sentence this short, the defendant would typically be serving it at the MDC, but I don't know

that for an absolute fact.

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And so, yes, if the Government would, let's say by end of day tomorrow, file a letter on the docket just indicating where it is the defendant will be surrendering to I think that will help. And the letter can even say that you've spoken to defense counsel about that and that they have the same understanding.

We'll get the judgment out as quickly as possible because it may be that even MDC needs to see the judgment before they can confirm.

Maybe a letter should be due by 2 p.m. on Thursday just to make sure we've sufficient time for the judgment to percolate through the system.

MS. WINIK: Yes, Your Honor.

MR. LEWIN: And, Judge, we've, I think, worked well together and will continue to work in terms of the self surrender.

It's my sense also that because a sentence of 60 days that Your Honor has imposed, especially in light of the 35 days already served, is almost certainly going to be served, because it's a shorter period, that whatever that difference is between the 35 days served is almost certainly going to be served at the MDC in Brooklyn.

Whether or not the defendant reports to the marshals and they then transport him to the MDC or in the

alternative he reports directly to the MDC, I just don't know the answer to, but we can work on it. And whatever understanding I have will come from Ms. Winik on that.

THE COURT: You agree?

MS. WINIK: That's correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. All right.

Mr. Alhussayen, you may appeal your conviction if you believe that your guilty plea was somehow unlawful or involuntary or if there's some other fundamental defect in the proceedings that was not waived by your guilty plea.

And under some circumstances a defendant also has the right to appeal his or her sentence. Any notice of appeal must be filed within 14 days of the entry of a judgment or within 14 days of the filing of a notice of appeal by the Government, whichever comes later.

If requested, the clerk will prepare and file a notice of appeal on your behalf. And if you cannot afford to pay the cost of an appeal or for appellate counsel, you will have the right to apply for leave to appeal in forma pauperis, which means you can apply to have the Court waive the filing fee. On appeal, you may also apply for courtappointed counsel.

What is the Government's position with respect to the terms of Mr. Alhussayen's release? Is that what?

MS. WINIK: The Government recommends that we keep

1 the same conditions in place until he surrenders on Friday.

THE COURT: Okay. Okay. All right.

Anything else from the Government's perspective that you believe we should take up today?

MS. WINIK: No. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Anything else from the defense

perspective?

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MR. LEWIN: No, Judge. Thank you.

THE COURT: I don't believe I've ordered yet the sealing of the Government's sentencing submissions. I think I put out an order saying that the defense motion to seal their sentencing submission is granted. I think the reasoning behind that order applies with at least equal force to the redactions in the Government's sentencing submission.

There is still a version of your sentencing submission on the docket here today and so I will order that sealed.

Mr. Alhussayen, I say in every sentencing that nobody should be defined in life only by the mistakes they've made. You've articulated candidly here today that you made mistakes and feel remorse for what you've done.

And that articulation, along with the very highquality arguments from your counsel on your behalf, have a
lot to do with where this sentence on this case ended up
today, along with the Government's position, obviously, which

1 I think could have gone a number of ways, perhaps differently than the way it actually went. 2 So, again, I wish you good luck in your future. I 3 encourage you to see this -- you may have been hoping for a 4 5 lighter sentence here today, but I would encourage you to see this sentence as a generous one given all the circumstances 6 7 here. You are obviously a person of academic talent and 8 somebody who's been a contributing member to your family and 9 10 community in Saudi Arabia and I hope going forward that you use all of your talents in life to be a force for good and 11 harmony among people, somebody who's trying to make the world 12 a better place instead of a worse place. 13 14 With that, we'll be adjourned. 15 (Proceedings adjourned at 5:21 p.m.) 16 I, CHRISTINE FIORE, Certified Electronic Court Reporter 17 and Transcriber, certify that the foregoing is a correct 18 transcript from the official electronic sound recording of 19 the proceedings in the above-entitled matter. 20 Christine Fiere 21 22 December 1, 2022 23 Christine Fiore, CERT 24 Transcriber 25